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Propaganda By Noam Chomsky
In opening that question for a little bit of discussion, let me begin
by counter-posing two different conceptions of democracy. One conception
of democracy has it that a democratic society is one in which the public
has the means to participate in some meaningful way in the management of
their own affairs and the means of information are open and free. If you
look up democracy in the dictionary you'll get a definition something like
that.
An alternative conception of democracy is that the public must be barred
from managing their own affairs and the means of information must be kept
narrowly and rigidly controlled. That may sound like an odd conception
of democracy, but it's important to understand that it is the prevailing
conception. In fact, it has long been, not just in operation, but even
in theory. There's a long history that goes back to the earliest modern
democratic revolutions in seventeenth century England which largely expresses
this point of view. I'm just going to keep to the modern period and say
a few words about how that notion of democracy develops and why and how
the problem of media and disinformation enters within that context.
EARLY HISTORY OF PROPAGANDA
Let's begin with the first modern government propaganda operation. That
was under the Woodrow Wilson Administration. Woodrow Wilson was elected
President in 1916 on the platform "Peace Without Victory." That was right
in the middle of the First World War. The population was extremely pacifistic
and saw no reason to become involved in a European war. The Wilson Administration
was actually commietted to war and had to do something about it. They established
a government propaganda commission, called the Creel Commission, which
succeeded, within six months, in turning a pacifist population into a hysterical,
war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything German, tear
the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world.
That was a major achievement, and it led to a further achievement. Right
at that time and after the war the same techniques were used to whip up
a hysterical Red Scare, as it was called, which succeeded pretty much in
destroying unions and eliminating such dangerous problems as freedom of
the press and freedom of political thought. There was very strong support
from the media, from the business establishment, which in fact organized--pushed
much of this work-- and it was in general a great success.
Among those who participated actively and enthusiastically were the
progressive intellectuals, people of the John Dewey circle, who took great
pride, as you can see from their own writings at the time, in having shown
that what they called the "more intelligent members of the community" --namely
themselves-- were able to drive a reluctant population into a war by terrifying
them and eliciting jingoist fanaticism. The means that were used were extensive.
For example, there was a good deal of fabrication of atrocities by the
Huns; Belgian babies with their arms torn off, all sorts of awful things
that you still read in history books. They were all invented by the British
propaganda ministry, whose own commitment at the time, as they put it in
their secret deliberations, was "to control the thought of all the world."
But more crucially they wanted to control the thought of the more intelligent
members of the community in the U.S., who would then disseminate the propaganda
that they were concocting and convert the pacifistic country to wartime
hysteria. That worked. It worked very well. And it taught a lesson: State
propaganda, when supported by the educated classes and when no deviation
is permitted from it, can have a big effect. It was a lesson learned by
Hitler and many others, and it has been pursued to this day.
SPECTATOR DEMOCRACY
Another group that was impressed by these successes were liberal Democratic
theorists and leading media figures, like, for example, Walter Lippmann,
who was the dean of American journalists, a major foreign and domestic
policy critic and also a major theorist of liberal democracy. If you take
a look at his collected essays, you'll see that they're subtitled something
like "A Progressive Theory of Liberal Democratic Thought." Lippmann was
involved in these propaganda commissions and recognized their achivements.
He argued that what he called a "revolution in the art of democracy," could
be used to manufacture consent, that is, to bring about agreement on the
part of the public for things that they didn't want by the new techniques
of propaganda. He also thought that this was a good idea, in fact necessary.
It was necessary because, as he put it, "the common interests elude public
opinion entirely" and can only be understood and managed by a specialized
class of responsible men who are smart enough to figure things out.
This theory asserts that only a small elite, the intellectual community
that the Deweyites were talking about, can understand the common interests,
what all of us care about, and that these things "elude the general public."
This is a view that goes back hundreds of years. It's also a typical Leninist
view. In fact, it has very close resemblance to the Leninist conception
that a vanguard of revolutionary intellectuals take state power, using
popular revolutions as the force that brings them to state power, and then
drive the stupid masses towards a future that they're too dumb and incompetent
to envision themselves.
The liberal democratic theory and Marxism-Leninism are very close in
their common ideological assumptions. I think that's one reason why people
have found it so easy over the years to drift from one position to another
without any particular sense of change. It's just a matter of assessing
where power is. Maybe there will be a popular revolution, and that will
put us into state power; or maybe there won't be, in which case we'll just
work for the people with real power: the business community. But we'll
do the same thing: We'll drive the stupid masses towards a world that they're
too dumb to understand for themselves.
Lippmann backed this up by a pretty elaborated theory of progressive
democracy. He argued that in a properly-functioning democracy there are
classes of citizens. There is first of all the class of citizens who have
to take some active role in running general affairs. That's the specialized
class. They are the people who analyze, execute, make decisions, and run
things in the political, economic, and ideological systems. That's a small
percentage of the population. Naturally, anyone who puts these ideas forth
is always part of that small group, and they're talking about what to do
about those others.
Those others, who are out of the small group, the big majority of the
population, they are what Lippmann called "the bewildered herd." We have
to protect ourselves from the trampling and rage of the bewildered herd.
Now there are two functions in a democracy: The specialized class, the
responsible men, carry out the executive function, which means they do
the thinking and planning and understand the common interests. Then, there
is the bewildered herd, and they have a function in democracy too. Their
function in a democracy, he said, is to be spectators, not participants
in action. But they have more of a function than that, because it's a democracy.
Occasionally they are allowed to lend their weight to one or another member
of the specialized class. In other words, they're allowed to say, "We want
you to be our leader" or "We want you to be our leader." That's because
it's a democracy and not a totalitarian state. That's called an election.
But once they've lent their weight to one or another member of the specialized
class they're supposed to sink back and become spectators of action, but
not participants. That's a properly functioning democracy.
And there's a logic behind it. There's even a kind of compelling moral
principle behind it. The compelling moral principle is that the mass of
the public is just too stupid to be able to understand things. If they
try to participate in managing their own affairs, they're just going to
cause trouble. Therefore it would be immoral and improper to permit them
to do this. We have to tame the bewildered herd, not allow the bewildered
herd to rage and trample and destroy things. It's pretty much the same
logic that says that it wold be improper to let a three-year-old run across
the street.
You don't give a three-year-old that kind of freedom because the three-year-old
doesn't know how to handle that freedom. Correspondingly, you don't allow
the bewildered herd to become participants in action. They'll just cause
trouble.
So we need something to tame the bewildered herd, and that something
is this new revolution in the art of democracy: the manufacture of consent.
The media, the schools, and popular culture have to be divided. For the
political class and the decision makers have to give them some tolerable
sense of reality, although they also have to instill the proper beliefs.
Just remember, there is an unstated premise here. The unstate premise
--and even the responsible men have to disguise this from themselves--
has to do with the question of how they get into the position where they
have the authority to make decisions.
The way they do that, of course, is by serving people with real power.
The people with real power are the ones who own the society, which is a
pretty narrow group. If the specialized class can come along and say, I
can serve your interests, then they'll be part of the executive group.
You've got to keep that quiet. That means they have to have instilled in
them the beliefs and doctrines that will serve the interests of private
power. Unless they can master that skill, they're not part of the specialized
class. So we have one kind of educational system directed to responsible
men, the specialized class. They have to be deeply indoctrinated in the
values and interests of private power and the state-corporate nexus that
represents it. If they can get through that, then they can be part of the
specialized class.
The rest of the bewildered herd just has to be basically distracted.
Turn their attention to something else. Keep them out of trouble. Make
sure that they remain at most spectators of action, occasionally lending
their weight to one or another of the real leaders, who they may select
among.
This point of view has been developed by lots of other people. In fact,
it's pretty conventional. For example, a leading contemporary theologian
and foreign policy critic Reinhold Niebuhr, sometimes called "the theologian
of the establishment," the guru of George Kennan and the Kennedy intellectuals
and others, put it that "rationality is a very narrowly restricted skill."
Only a small number of people have it. Most people are guided by just emotion
and impulse.
Those of us who have rationality have to create necessary illusions
and emotionally potent over-simplifications to keep the naive simpletons
more or less on course. This became a substantial part of contemporary
political science. In the 1920's and early 1930's, Harold Lasswell, the
founder of the modern field of communications and one of the leading American
political scientists, explained that we should not succumb to "democratic
dogmatisms" about men being the best judges of their own interests. Because
their not. We're the best judges of the public interests. Therefore, just
out of ordinary morality, we have to make sure that they don't have the
opportunity to act on the basis of their misjudgments.
In what is nowadays called a totalitarian state, then a military state,
it's easy. You just hold a bludgeon over their heads, and if they get out
of line you smash them over the head. But as society has become more free
and democratic, you lose that capacity. Therefore you have to turn to the
techniques of propaganda. The logic is clear. Propaganda is to a democracy
what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state. That's wise and good because,
again, the common interests elude the bewildered herd. They can't figure
them out.
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